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Abstract—Telecom companies are severely damaged by bypass 
fraud (SIMboxing). However, There is a shortage of published 
research to tackle this problem. The traditional method of Test 
Call Generators (TCG) is easily overcome by fraudsters and the 
need for more sophisticated ways is inevitable. In this work, we 
are developing intelligent algorithms that mine a huge amount of 
mobile operator’s data and detect the SIMs that used to bypass 
international calls. This method will make it hard for fraudsters 
to generate revenue and hinder their network. Also by reducing 
fraudulent activities, quality of service can be increased as well as 
customer satisfaction. Our technique has been tested and 
evaluated on real world mobile operator data, and it proved to be 
very efficient. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Imagine you get an unknown call from a local number, you 
pick up the phone and it’s from a friend or a family living 
abroad, it does feel strange that you would receive an 
international call from a local number; this is basically the 
bypass fraud, or SIMboxing. In this case, the international 
calls are transferred over the Internet to a cellular device that 
injects them back into the cellular network through SIM boxes 
with multiple low-cost prepaid SIM cards. As a result, the 
calls turn local at the destination network and the fraudsters 
who set up these boxes pay only local rates for mobile 
operators after charging international rates from the source. 
The person calling will pay the whole call termination fee, but 
it would not be collected by his/her local operator; this fee will 
go to the fraudster responsible for the SIM box and other 
companies that are responsible for directing the calls from 
source to destination.   
 
Most people think of fraudsters as hackers, but this is not 
always the case, most of the time they are business people, 
they perceive the fraudulent activity as a business opportunity, 
where they are willing to invest time and money to gain 
benefit. So, we believe that fraudsters could be defeated by 
simply putting them out of business. 
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In this work, a detection system is designed and tested in 
cooperation with the Tier 1 mobile operator in Libya 
(Almadar Aljadeed Mobile Phone Company). The system is 
utilizing artificial intelligence techniques to detect whether a 
SIM card is used by a normal customer or by a fraudster. 
II. IMPACT OF FRAUD  
Telecommunications, which have become a necessity 
worldwide, became a target for fraudsters who are making a 
lot of money out of illegally accessing communication 
networks and using it to make huge profits, by selling services 
at much lower prices than their original prices. According to a 
survey by the Communication Fraud Control Association 
(CFCA) [1], the mobile telecom industry lost more than 38 
billion dollars in 2015 alone due to telecom fraud. Besides 
those big losses, telecom fraud causes other indirect losses to 
mobile operators, like: decrease in quality of service, deny of 
service and network congestion. 
 
 Bypass fraud costs telecom companies 6 billion 
annually and ranked the 2
nd
 most costly fraud worldwide. Fig. 
1 shows the top 3 fraud types with their annual losses. The 
numbers are huge, since major mobile operators in Libya are 
owned by the state, the revenue obtained by these major 
companies could help in Libya’s economic growth, and 
anything that would affect it would degrade the country’s 
GDP. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  CFCA 2015 survey, Top 3 fraud losses globally 
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III. TYPES OF FRAUD 
Phone systems fraud is not just due to phone theft or 
hacking, It is much more than that. Yelland [2] lists seven of 
them. The top three types that cause a significant loss are: 
A. International Revenue Share Fraud (IRSF) 
IRSF is the largest contributor to the overall fraud losses 
according to CFCA. It is when a Fraudester makes an 
agreement with a local carrier in high cost destination to share 
profit for increasing traffic, then the fraudster hacks into any 
organization's public branch exchange (PBX) and gets illegal 
access to generate calls. After that, the fraudster generates 
high traffic calls to high cost destinations and gets revenue 
from the sharing agreements. [4].  
B. Premium Rate Service Fraud    
It must have happened to you; that is receiving a text 
message saying that you won a big prize and all what you 
need to do is to call a certain number. If you called that 
number you have been tricked to use some premium rate 
service. Premium rate service is an agreement between some 
service provider and telecom companies to share revenues  
generated by traffic to the premium service number, it is used 
in TV shows and contests and entertainment services. The 
fraudsters try to stimulate the costumers by giving them a 
missed call or a message, then make money from share of the 
call back revenues [4]. 
C. Bypass fraud  
To explain how bypass fraud is committed, firstly we 
describe the legitimate way for international calls. Let’s 
assume that caller A and caller B live in different countries. 
Caller A makes a call to caller B over the mobile operator. 
The mobile operator of country A takes the call and send it 
through his international gate to a transient operator. The 
transient operator then routes the call through voice over IP 
(VoIP) to the country B mobile operator and pays a toll. After 
that, the mobile operator of country B terminates the call 
through his network to caller B. Fig. 2  shows the legitimate 
route.  
 
 
Fig. 2. The legitimate route of international call 
In bypass fraud, the transient operator route the call 
through a SIMbox placed in country B using VoIP, the 
SIMbox then reroute the call through country B mobile 
operator and pay for just the local call. Fig. 3 shows the 
bypass fraud route. 
 
Fig. 3. The bypass fraud route of international call 
The incentive here is the toll charge by country B mobile 
operator is much higher than the local call fee, so the bypass 
will be financially viable. 
 
Bypass fraud is committed when fraudsters install 
SIMboxes with multiple low-cost, prepaid SIM cards. SIMbox 
equipments includes SIM slots, antennas. The SIMbox is 
connected to the internet through Ethernet port. Fig. 4  shows 
a SIMbox and its components. 
 
 
Fig. 4.   A SIMbox and its components 
IV. BATTLING BYPASS FRAUD  
The major methods used today for battling fraudsters are: 
A. Test Call Generation (TCGs) 
Test call generation is used as an active method to detect 
bypass fraud, where operators test different international 
routes to their network and see whether calls go through 
legitimate routes or SIMbox routes. This method detects fraud 
with no false positive (that is when a normal user assumed to 
be a SIMbox). However, this method is probabilistic in nature 
and costly in terms of the need to test huge number of 
international routes. Also, fraudsters use tricks to avoid test 
call detection as we will see in the anti-spam method.  
B. Fraud Management Systems (FMS) 
Fraud management systems use measures to detect the 
abnormal usage of SIM cards. FMS analyze Call Details 
Record (CDR) data to make usage profiling that distinguishes 
normal users from SIMboxes. 
C. SIM Card Distribution Control (SDC) 
SIM cards are vital in the bypass cycle, and fraudsters 
must maintain an adequate supply of SIM cards to be in 
business. However, SIM card distribution control will make 
this process difficult. Requiring government IDs and limiting 
the number of SIM cards per ID will prevent fraudsters from 
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obtaining a large number of SIM cards to install in their 
SIMboxes. 
V. HOW FRAUDSTERS AVOID DETECTION 
Fraudsters and anti-fraud are in eternal battle, every time 
detection technology improves, fraudsters are developing their 
methods to avoid detection and increase profit. This section 
describes different methods used by fraudsters to avoid SIM 
blocking. 
A. Anti-Spam (Test Call Detection) 
One of the effective methods to detect SIMs used in 
SIMboxes is generating test calls (TCG) using different routes 
to known local network numbers. The incoming call will 
appear weather it is coming from a local number or from an  
international number; if it was coming from a local number 
then it must be associated with some SIM card used in a 
SIMbox and easily processed by the fraud department. 
However, the fraudsters analyze the voice call traffic coming 
toward their SIMboxes and based on usage and other patterns 
they could determine whether the calls were real subscriber 
calls or they were originated from a TCG system. They coud 
then either block the test calls and prevent them from reaching 
the SIM box, to begin with, or reroute the calls to a legitimate 
route so as to avoid detection. 
 
B.  Human Behavior Simulation (HBS)  
According to the literature [3], some features can be used 
to identify SIMbox fraud, for example: 1. The SIMbox is not 
moving. 2. Most calls are outgoing calls. 3. No usage of 
network services like SMS, GPRS. and others. However, 
Smart SIMboxes are designed to mimic the behavior of 
normal customers by using Human Behavior Simulation 
(HBS). This technique makes detection of fraudsters very 
difficult if no advanced detection algorithms were used. HBS 
encompasses the following: 
 
1) SIM Migration (Movability) 
Fraudsters are deploying many gateways in different 
locations, for example, one in the city center and another in a 
shopping mall or some other crowded place and once in a 
while they swap the SIM cards between the gateways, so it 
would look like that the user is moving. The swapping 
operation could be done manually or automatically using 
software. 
2)  SIM Rotation  
SIMboxes can be detected easily if fraudsters operate their 
SIMs around the hour excessively, so they limit their usage by 
rotation of the SIMs as workers shifts. This will make SIMs 
operate in limited hours a day, which simulates the behavior 
of ordinary customers.  
 
3) Usage of Other Network Services  
Most of the SIMboxes are using just voice services and 
that makes them vulnerable to detection. In order to mitigate 
this issue smart SIMboxes are making calls and sending SMS 
to each other. Also, sometimes they use some internet services 
provided by the network operator. 
 
4) Family Lists 
Traditional SIMboxes just reroute the call from VoIP to 
the GSM network, so they make calls to large numbers of 
different network customers. A smart way to avoid this is by 
using family lists, where each SIM is assigned to reroute calls 
to a specific list of numbers. This leads to escaping the trap of 
large different numbers detection. 
 
To summarize, Human Behavior Simulation (HBS) makes 
dealing with bypass fraud harder and harder and time-
consuming. Advanced measures must be taken to tackle this 
problem. In this work, intelligent machine learning algorithms 
were used to detect the bypass fraud by analyzing huge CDR 
data. 
VI. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Even though the telecommunication industry suffers major 
losses due to fraud, there is no comprehensive published 
research on this area mainly due to lack of publicly available 
data to perform experiments on. On the other hand, any broad 
research published publicly about fraud detection methods 
will be utilized by fraudsters to evade detection. 
This section presents the literature of the available research 
published. Most research investigated CDR analysis combined 
with machine learning algorithms to detect fraudulent 
SIMboxes  [4] [5] [3], and few others used Audio analysis [6].  
In [4], 234,324 calls made by 6415 subscribers from one 
Cell-ID during two months were analyzed. The dataset 
consisted of 2126 fraud subscribers and 4289 normal 
subscribers which are equivalent to two thirds of legitimate 
subscribers and one third of fraudulent SIMboxes. The 
researchers extracted 9 features, like Total Calls, Total 
Number Called, Total Minutes and Average Minutes, etc. 
Then they used the extracted features to train an Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) classifier, where three architectures of 
neural networks were considered and three hidden layers; 5, 9 
and 18 hidden nodes in each layer. They found that the best 
architecture was when two hidden layers were used, each 
having five hidden neurons, with a learning rate of 0.6 and a 
momentum term of 0.3. The accuracy reached 98.7% with just 
20 accounts were wrongly classified as false positive. 
In [5], researchers extended their previous work in [4] to 
design and compare two classifiers; Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) classifier and ANN classifier. Same dataset and 
features were used. They found that SVM has better accuracy 
compared to ANN. SVM gave 99.06% accuracy while ANN 
model gave 98.69% accuracy. In addition, the SVM training 
time was found to be three times less than the time consumed 
by the ANN training time. 
Another more broad research was conducted by [3]. In 
contrast with [4] and [5], where data was constrained to only 
one Cell-ID, a larger dataset was used with accounts 
distributed nationwide. They analyzed CDRs form main 
cellular operator in the United States (AT&T). The dataset 
contains CDRs of 93000 legitimate accounts and 500 of 
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fraudulent accounts. For training the classifier they split the 
dataset to two-thirds for training and one third for testing. 
Using International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) as a 
device identifier other than the subscriber identifier they 
computed 48 features characterizing patterns of legitimate and 
fraudulent IMEIs. 
They observed that fraudulent SIMboxes have common 
patterns as the following: 
1) High number of Int. mobile subscriber identity 
number (IMSIs) per IMEI. 
2) Static physical location. 
3) Large number of international phone calls. 
4) Large volume of outgoing calls generated compared 
to incoming calls.  
 
For classification, they used a combination of decision tree 
classifiers (alternating decision tree, functional tree, and 
random forest). The classification rule was the linear 
combination of their results. The accuracy of the classification 
rule was 99.95%. with lowest false positive achieved by the 
random forest. 
On the other hand, instead of using CDR analysis, [6] used 
real-time call audio analysis to detect fraudulent calls. They 
designed a system that relies on the raw voice data received by 
the tower during a call to distinguish errors in GSM 
transmission from the distinct audio distortions caused by 
delivering the call over a VoIP. They used fast signal 
processing techniques to identify whether individual calls are 
likely made by a SIMbox and then to develop profiles of SIM 
cards. Their resultant system was able to detect 87% of real 
SIMbox calls in only 30 seconds of audio with no false 
positives. Their system promises a real-time detection 
capability if it were deployed on network towers and 
embedded on the operators Base Transceiver Station (BTS).  
VII. DESIGNING THE DETECTIN SYSTEM 
Designing the detection system was done in four stages:  
 Data Collection and Cleaning: In cooperation with 
Almadar Aljadeed Mobile Phone Company, fully 
anonymized Call Detailed Records (CDR) were 
obtained and utilized. The CDR’s sensitive data like 
user numbers or identities were obfuscated and hashed 
by the mobile operator. CDR data was processed in 
order to remove missing values, duplicate information 
and useless fields (here we used Pathon filters).  
 Feature Extraction and Engineering: To prepare the 
data for the machine learning model, informative 
features were extracted. In this stage features for each 
SIM were extracted. Also, features had been 
engineered in order to get the best features for training 
the model. Feature engineering includes feature 
selection and dimensionality reduction in generating 
more useful features. 
 Model Training: The features extracted in the previous 
stage were used to train machine learning models. In 
this stage, different models were trained to detect SIMs 
that were used in SIMboxes. SVM and Decision trees 
(random forest algorithm) had been used as supervised 
learning algorithms, and since the labeled data is 
scarce, we used unsupervised learning algorithms to 
cluster the SIMs in order to get insights of how we 
could  improve the designed algorithm.  
 Model Evaluation and Testing: The final stage was 
testing and comparing the performance of designed 
algorithms in terms of accuracy and precision and that 
showed that our system is very efficient. We tested our 
system on real time data on site, where we took our 
system to our sponsor (Almadar Aljadeed Mobile 
Phone Company) headquarters and our tests showed 
the high efficiency of our bypass fraud detection 
system.  
 
Fearing that fraudesters might use information published 
here to their advantage, affected how much details we could   
reveal, but, our data and detailed work techniques would be 
available for all of those concerned in our presentation. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
We have studied the problem of bypass fraud (SIMboxing) 
and found that although bypass fraud has been damaging 
telecom companies severely, there has been a shortage of 
published research to study it and solve it. So our work has 
been two fold, one is to increase awareness about this big 
problem and to show that conventional techniques could not 
be used to solve it. We utilized some intelligent techniques to 
effectively detect SIMboxing fraud and prevent it from 
affecting telecomm companies not only when it comes to 
revenues but also when it comes to denial of service, quality 
of service, and communications network congestion.  
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